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Abstract
Recent years have seen the fast spread of legalized gaming throughout the world.
Amid the frenzied gaming boom, new casinos have mushroomed on every continent.
Casinos in different continents operate in different legal and market environments and
may have performed quite differently. This study examines the performance results of U.
S. casinos, those in Nevada and on the Las Vegas Strip in particular, in comparison with
Dutch and French casinos in 1998. It was found that Dutch and French casinos
outperformed U. S. casinos in both revenue efficiency and profitability. Noncompetitive
European gaming markets most likely have helped European casinos achieve better
results.
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Legalized gaming, casino gaming in particular, is spreading all over the world.
Thompson ( 1998) notes that during the period 1986-1996, the number of world gaming
jurisdictions increased from 140 to 160. Within the U.S., casinos outside of Nevada and
New Jersey increased by more than 300. In Europe, legalized casino operations
expanded from 20 countries to 32 during the same period. The casino industry was one
of the fastest growing industries in the 1990s. Patterns of gambling operations, however,
vary considerably in different countries.
Veer (1998) points out that the European gaming market is a multitude of gaming
monopolies guarded by the state. According to Thompson (1998), while corporate
casinos have become the normative organizational structure in North America, European
casinos, tied in both organizational and marketing terms, have yet to assume the massmarketed casino models. Many European casinos are typically government-owned, lowvolume establishments with access restricted and play dominated by table games.
Furthermore, European casinos make few promotions and advertisements. The
government plays a major role in the gaming industry either as an owner, or as an owner
of the properties where the casinos are located. In some cases, the taxes are so high that
the government can be regarded as the primary owner, extracting money from the
establishment. Summarizing the status of European casino gaming, Ader, Falcone, and
Steinberg ( 1999) point out that the casino industry in Europe is dominated by small
venues tightly regulated and/or owned by the state, with restrictions on marketing,
accessibility, and competition.
On the other hand, as noted by Thompson ( 1998), the North American casino
industry, having successfully adopted the corporate structure, operates in an open and
competitive atmosphere. This atmosphere has fostered a tremendous growth in the
casino industry, particularly in Las Vegas, which has become the leading center of
1
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casino gaming in the world. Operation practices are in direct contradiction to European
operating standards. Every effort is made to satisfy customer demand and profit margins.
For example, Las Vegas and Atlantic City draw crowds of players with 24-hour casinos,
which are colorful and exciting. Casino firms make every marketing effort possible to
fill their hotel rooms to increase gaming profits. The benign gaming taxation in the U.S.
has also helped propel the gaming expansion in the U.S. Bos (1996) notes that gaming
tax rates in all U. S. jurisdictions are much lower than those in Europe.
Evidently, casinos in the U. S. and Europe operate in quite different legal and
market environments. The question is, what has become of the old-fashioned European
casinos? Or, how are European casinos doing in comparison with their U. S. rivals in
competing for the lion's share of the global casino gaming business? This study attempts
to answer the questions by analyzing casino operation results in the U. S. in contrast to
those of some European casinos. The findings of the study should help deepen our
understanding of casino gaming from a global perspective.

Data and Methodology
All data used in this comparative study were based on 1998 operation results. For
U.S. casino operations, the 1998 aggregate performance data of the industry were
obtained from the industry ratios provided by http://www.marketguide.com (1998).
Further, operation data of casinos of Nevada and the Las Vegas Strip were used for more
detailed analysis, cost analysis in particular. Nevada and Strip data were obtained from
Nevada Gaming Abstract (1998) and Nevada's Gaming Revenue Report (JanuaryDecember, 1998), published by Nevada Gaming Control Board in 1999. The reason for
selecting Nevada, rather than other U. S. gaming jurisdictions, for this comparison study
was that Nevada was the largest and oldest gaming jurisdiction in the U. S. Besides,
Nevada Gaming Abstract (1998) provided detailed aggregate income statements and
balance sheets of casinos, which were unavailable from other U. S. gaming jurisdictions
when the study was conducted. It would be ideal to include Native American casinos in
the study because they are similar to European casinos in terms of a noncompetitive
market environment. Their operating statistics, however, were unavailable due to the
fact that they were private clubs (Cabot, Thompson, Tottenham, & Braunlich, 1999).
For European casino operations in this study, due to limited data availability, only
casinos of the Netherlands and Group Partouche Casinos-Hotels of France were
examined. The lack of mass-marketed corporate models in the European casino industry
makes casino operation data extremely hard to obtain. Attempts were made to contact all
the European gaming regulatory bodies listed in the European Casino Report ( 1999).
Few responded and provided usable data. Only Holland Casino 1998 Annual Report
(Holland Casino, 1999, March) and 1998 Facts & Figures (Holland Casino, 1998, April)
contained operation information comparable to that of U.S. casinos. In addition, the
1998 Annual Report of Group Partouche Casinos-Hotels of France (Group Partouche,
1999) and statistics released by the Interior Ministry of France provided some
comparable information of French casinos.
The Netherlands legalized casino gambling in 1975 to keep Dutch gamblers in the
country. The nation's 10 casinos are all operated by Holland Casino, a public company
consisting of national tourism organizations (Ader, et al., 1999). The Gaming Act of the
Netherlands allows the government to issue only one licence, which went to Holland
Casino in 1975 and was renewed in 1996 for the duration of five years (Cabot, et al.,
1999). As the only licence holder, Holland Casino has secured a complete monopoly in the
Dutch casino industry. The Partouche Group of France, operators of 23 casinos and 16
hotels throughout Europe, is the largest casino company in France with about 18% of
French market shares (Masud, 1999). In France, while a nationwide gaming monopoly is
absent, other barriers to entry exist. Casinos are limited to resort areas and in cities with
populations in excess of 500,000. All casinos must have majority French ownership (Ader,

54

UNLV Gaming Research & Review Joumal • Volume 6, Issue 2

Perfonnance Gaps Between U.S. and European Casinos

et al., 1999). The licensing process is extremely lengthy and slow (Cabot, et al., 1999).
This study first compared casino performance in terms of gaming revenue per slot!
table and revenue and profits per employee. Here, figures in French francs and Holland
guilders were converted to U. S. dollars using 1998 average daily exchange rates.
Secondly, based on available data, six financial ratios were derived to identify the
differences in efficiency and profitability. Finally, a vertical analysis of major cost
components was conducted to examine cost differences. Cost items of casino operations
were expressed as percentages of either total casino revenue or gaming revenue.

Unit Efficiency and Profitability
The size of the European casino industry is by no means comparable to that of
Nevada. In 1998, the Las Vegas Strip alone achieved gaming revenue of $3.4 billion. In
comparison, the French casino industry, the largest in Europe, realized $1.6 billion, less
than half of the Strip's gaming revenue. In the same year, Holland's 10 casinos
generated a total of $387 million.
Casinos in the two European countries, however, outperformed Nevada casinos in
both efficiency and profitability on a per unit basis. Table 1 demonstrates the
performance gaps. In 1998, the average daily win per slot was $80 for Nevada and $96
for the Strip. By contrast, daily win per slot was $152 in Holland and $319 in France.
For table games, Holland casinos raked in $2,232 per table per day in 1998, comparing
favorably with Nevada's average of $1.302 and the Strip's $2,182. French casinos' daily
win per table was $2,103, slightly lower than the average of the Strip.

Table 1. Efficiency and Profitability Per Unit (in US $)
Holland
France Partouche
319
152
Rev Per Slot/Day
NA
2,232
2,103
Rev Per Table/Day
NA
NA
Rev Per Employee/Day 356
256
NA
71
NI Per Employee/Day
58
Note: Rev= revenue, and NI =net income.

us
NA
NA
325
49

Nevada
80
1,302
208
17*

LV Strip
96
2,182
248
27*

*For Nevada and the Strip, the figure was income before corporate tax. The after-tax
net income figures of Nevada and the Strip were not available. Using after-tax income
would make their NI Per Employee/Day ($) smaller.
Higher labor productivity is another feature of casino operations in the two
European countries. In 1998, daily casino revenue per employee in Holland was $356,
greater than the U.S. average of $325 and substantially higher than Nevada's $208 and
the Strip's $248. French casinos' nationwide average per employee revenue was
unavailable. Group Partouche, the largest casino company in France, achieved daily
revenue of $256 per employee in 1998, beating the Strip's $248 but lower than the U.S.
average of $325.
On a per employee basis, each employee of Holland Casino created $58 net income
per day in 1998, while French Partouche realized a net income of $71 per employee
daily. By contrast, the U.S. casino industry averaged $49. Nevada and Strip casinos' per
employee profits were even lower. The Strip casinos generated about $27 before-tax
income per employee per day and Nevada casinos averaged only $17. The after-tax net
income figures of Nevada and Strip casinos, which were unavailable, should be even
lower.
The lower revenue and profits per employee of Nevada and Strip casinos indicate
that they may be more labor-intensive than European casinos. Following the operation
philosophy of making every effort to satisfy customer demand and profit margins
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(Thompson, 1998), Nevada and Strip casinos are likely to hire more people to perform
services, thus leading to lower per employee revenue and profits.

Efficiency and Profitability by Ratios
Six ratios were calculated to further evaluate the revenue efficiency and
profitability. Assets turnover (AT) ratio is total revenue divided by total assets. The ratio
tells how much revenue is generated for every dollar invested in the assets during a
given period. Fixed assets turnover (FAT) is a ratio of total revenue to total fixed assets.
It shows the amount of revenue provided by every dollar invested in a firm's fixed
assets. Operating efficiency ratio (OER), a profitability measure, is a ratio of operating
profits, or income before fixed charges and taxes, to total revenue. This ratio is a better
measure of management performance because it excludes the impact of factors such as
interest, depreciation, and rents over which the management has no control. Profit
margin (PM), also a profitability ratio, is after-tax net income divided by total revenue.
The ratio shows from every dollar of revenue how much is left as net profits after
subtracting all costs. Return on assets (ROA), which is net income to total assets,
measures return on investment in total assets. It is the return on the investment funds
provided by shareholders and creditors. Finally, return on equity (ROE) is net income
divided by equity. It measures the return to the fund provided by the equity owners.
Table 2 presents the six ratios of the casino operations for comparison.

Table 2. Efficiencl: and Profitabilitl: by Ratios
Ratio
AT
FAT
OER
PM
ROA
ROE

Holland
2.38
2.95
0.45
0.15
0.35
2.59

Partouche
0.90
1.20
0.58
0.21
0.19
0.40

us
0.45
0.60
0.21
0.08
0.03
0.07

Nevada
0.81
1.05
0.25
0.08*
0.09*
0.11*

LV Strip
0.74
0.95
0.26
0.11 *
0.10*
0.13*

Note: AT =Assets Turnover, FAT = Fixed Assets Turnover, OER = Operating Efficiency
Ratio, PM = Profit margin, ROA = Return on Assets, and ROE = Return on Equity
*The after-tax net income was not available for Nevada and the Strip. Before-tax
income was used to calculate PM, ROA and ROE for them. Using after-tax income
would make those ratios lower.
The better efficiency of Holland and French casinos in generating revenue is
reflected in their higher AT and FAT ratios. In 1998, Holland casinos achieved an AT
ratio of 2.38. In other words, from $1 investment in casino assets, Holland casinos were
able to create $2.38 revenue during the year. The ratio for Partouche was 0.90. By
contrast, Nevada's AT ratio was 0.81 and the Strip casinos' AT, 0.74, was even lower.
The U. S. average, 0.45, was the lowest. One dollar investment in casino assets in the U.
S. generated, on average, only $0.45 revenue, less than one fifth of Holland Casino's
achievement. The ranking of FAT ratios among the five is the same as that of AT ratios,
suggesting that U. S. casinos were less efficient in using total assets and fixed assets to
generate revenue. The higher AT and FAT ratios of Holland Casino and French
Partouche indicate that the gaming markets in Holland and France in 1998 were more
favorable for casino operators in terms of supply/demand balance. The gaming boom in
the U.S. has created many new mega casino resorts, particularly in Las Vegas. This has
dramatically increased the assets base of the industry. The lower AT and FAT ratios of
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the U. S. casino industry mirror a huge increase in gaming capacity that has been
accompanied by a less desirable increase in demand.
Casinos in Holland and France have also demonstrated better profitability in the
ratio comparisons. The OER ratios of Holland Casino. 0.45, and Partouche, 0.58, show
that operating profits of Holland Casino and French Partouche were more than double
the U.S. average of 0.21. Nevada and Strip casinos' OER ratios, 0.25 and 0.26
respectively, were slightly better than the U.S. average but significantly lower than their
Dutch and French rivals. In terms of PM ratio, from $1 of revenue, Holland casinos
derived $0.15 net income, while Group Partouche of France achieved $0.21. In
calculating the PM ratios for Nevada and the Las Vegas Strip, before-tax income was
used because after-tax net income was not available in Nevada Gaming Abstract (1998).
In Nevada, the before-tax income from $1 of casino revenue was only $0.08. The Strip
casinos, the best performers of Nevada, managed to earn $0.11. The after-tax PM ratios
of Nevada and the Strip should be even smaller. The overall U.S. casino industry earned
$0.08 after-tax net income per dollar of revenue, which was about half Holland Casino's
figure.
With respect to ROA and ROE ratios, the Las Vegas Strip, achieving a ROA of 0.10
or 10% and a ROE of 0.13 or 13%, evidently outperformed the U. S., which averaged a
ROA of 3% and a ROE of 7%, and Nevada, which averaged 9% for ROA and 11% for
ROE. However, Holland Casino's 35% (ROA) and 259% (ROE) and French Partouche's
19% (ROA) and 40% (ROE) far outshone the Strip's results. Nevada Gaming Abstract
(1998) does not report after-tax net income. Therefore, before-tax income had to be used
to calculate ROA and ROE ratios for Nevada and the Strip. Using after-tax net income
would make their two ratios even lower. High debt leverage should have contributed to
the extremely high ROE of Holland Casino. In 1998, Holland Casino had a debt ratio,
which was total debt to total assets, of 0.87 (Holland Casino, 1999). In other words, 87%
of its casino assets were funded by debts. The debt ratio for French Partouche was 0.54
(Group Partouche Casinos-Hotels, 1999). The U.S., Nevada, and the Strip had the ratio
at 0.61 (http://www.marketguide.com, 1998), 0.44 and 0.39 (Nevada Gaming Abstract,
1999) respectively. Using more debts and less equity, Holland Casino was able to
achieve a substantially higher ROE ratio.

Cost Analysis
A cost analysis should help explain why Holland Casino and French Partouche were
more profitable. Table 3 presents major cost items as percentages of gaming revenue or
total revenue. The U.S. was not listed because aggregated data of cost items of the U.S.
casino industry were not available. Since casinos' marketing and promotion
expenditures were incurred mainly for promoting gaming activities, they were presented
as a percentage of gaming revenue rather than total revenue. The gaming tax was also
expressed as a percentage of gaming revenue because it was levied against gaming
revenue only.

Table 3. Casino Cost Comparisons
Holland
Gaming Tax
25.5
(%of gaming revenue)
Labor Cost (% of revenue)
36.6
Marketing/Promotion
12.8
(%of gaming revenue)
Other Taxes (% of revenue)
0.1
Interest(% of revenue)
1.0

Partouche
28.2

Nevada
6.3

LV Strip
6.3

22.6
2.5

34.8
21.0

33.6
22.3

4.0
1.2

1.1
2.6

1.0
2.1
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Depreciation. & Amortization
(%of revenue)
Other Operation Expenses
(%of revenue)

8.5
8.1

4.5
13.5

7.2
30.4

7.4
30.2

Note: Other taxes include value added tax for Holland Casino, corporate income tax and
value added tax for Partouche, and gaming licence and real estate taxes for Nevada and
Las Vegas Strip
European casinos undoubtedly are disadvantageously positioned in terms of gaming
tax. The impact of European government involvement on casino expenses is largely
reflected on their high average tax rates on gaming revenue. According to Cabot, et al.
(1999), the gaming tax structure of Nevada is more favorable for casinos than those of
the Netherlands and France. Nevada levies 3% of gross gaming revenue from $0 to
$50,000,4% of gross gaming revenue from $50,000 to $134,000, and 6.25% of gross
gaming revenue in excess of $134,000. In addition, there are quarterly and annual slot
and table fees. In France, taxes are based on theoretical gaming wins with progressive
tax rates ranging from 10% for up to 380,000 francs to 80% for wins over 61,875,000
francs. In the Netherlands, the gaming taxes on gross gaming wins are 33.3 %for table
games and 17.5% for slots. In Table 3, total gaming taxes levied are expressed as
percentages of total gaming revenues, representing their respective average gaming tax
rates. In 1998, taxes levied against gaming revenues, on average, were 25.5% for
Holland Casino and 28.2% for Group Partouche of France, much higher than the 6.3%
average rate of Nevada and the Strip.
As shown in Table 3, while Holland Casino's labor cost, 36.6% of its total revenue,
was slightly higher than Nevada's 34.8% and the Strip's 33.6%, Partouche's labor cost
was much lower, 22.6% of the revenue. The low labor cost of
Partouche was likely due to two reasons. First, slot revenue
European casinos undoubtedly
constituted a much larger percentage of total gaming revenue in
are disadvantageously
France than in Holland and Nevada. In 1998, slot revenue was
88% of gaming revenue in France (Interior Ministry of France,
positioned in terms of gaming
1999), compared with 44% for Holland Casino (Holland Casino
tax.
1998 Annual Report), 49% on the Strip, and 61% in Nevada
(Nevada Gaming Control Board, 1999). Low labor cost associated
with slots operation could have substantially brought down the labor cost percentage of
Partouche.
The lower labor cost percentage of Partouche may also be due to its accounting method.
Holland Casino's labor cost included payroll, social security charges, insurance
premiums, and retirement benefits (pension), similar to those of Nevada casinos. The 1998
Annual Report of Group Partouche shows that its 1998 labor cost included wages and
salaries, employee profit sharing, paid leave, and social security but excluded commitment
on employee retirement benefits, which, as the Report states, was considered insignificant.
The exclusion of retirement benefits could lower Partouche · s labor cost.
Another major cost item in Table 3 is Marketing/Promotion cost. In comparison
with Nevada and Strip casinos, Dutch and French casinos spent much less on marketing
and promotion, confirming Thompson's (1998) observation that European casinos make
few promotions and advertisements. In 1998, the marketing and promotion expenses of
Holland Casino and French Partouche were 12.8% and 2.5% oftheir gaming revenues
respectively, significantly lower than Nevada's 21%. The Strip casinos spent even more
on marketing and promotion, 22.3% of their gaming revenue. Holland Casino does not
have its own hotels to accommodate players. For its premium customers, Holland
Casino provides them with free accommodation at other hotels, making its Marketing/
Promotion cost higher than Partouche's.
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Compared with Nevada, Holland and France do not seem to have stricter legal
restrictions on casino advertisements. In the Netherlands, the only restriction imposed
on casino marketing is the code of conduct for casino gaming supervised by the Dutch
Advertisement Board. The code excludes advertising regarding minors, winning easy
money and stimulating compulsive gambling (Cabot, et al., 1999). Holland is one of the
few countries in Europe allowing casinos to advertise on television (Ader, et al., 1999).
France's stance on casino advertisements is even less prohibitive. The national gaming
law and regulations place no restrictions on advertising. Various casinos use all media to
inform the public of their gaming products. On the other hand, some contracts restrict
local advertising, or limit advertising to information regarding shows, restaurants, or
other non-gaming products of the resort (Cabot, et al., 1999). Both Holland and France
have no restrictions on casino promotion. It is apparent that the lower marketing and
promotion costs of Holland Casino and Group Partouche were not due to legal
restrictions, but due to the lack of necessity of massive marketing and promotion. The
much lower marketing and promotion expenses of Holland Casino and French Partouche
were evidence that the gaming markets in Holland and France were less competitive
than U.S. markets. Casinos there did not need to spend much on marketing and
promotion to maintain or boost their revenues.
The interest expenses of Holland Casino and Partouche, 1.0% and 1.2% of their
casino revenues respectively, were less than half of Nevada's 2.6% and about half of the
Strip's 2.1 %. Their ability to borrow at low costs is surprising. As mentioned earlier, the
debt ratios of Holland Casino and Partouche were 0.87 and 0.54 respectively,
substantially higher than Nevada's 0.44 and the Strip's 0.39. Obviously, Holland Casino
and French Partouche used more debt financing at lower borrowing cost. In particular,
Holland Casino had the lowest interest cost percentage, although its debt ratio, 0.87, was
the highest. This fact suggests that the business risk associated with Holland Casino was
low enough to encourage lenders to provide loans at low interest rates. Having secured
market monopoly, Holland Casino faced no competition in the Netherlands. For French
Partouche, the competition it had to face, if any, should not be comparable to the
cutthroat competition among mass-marketed casino corporations in the U. S.
Monopolistic or noncompetitive markets could help stabilize operating cash flow for
Dutch and French casinos and hence, lowering their business risk as perceived by
lenders. Lower business risk helps offset the perceived financial risk associated with
debts (Van Home, 1998 ), thus making lenders willing to make loans at lower interests.
The depreciation and amortization costs of Holland, Nevada, and the Strip, 8.5%,
7.2%, and 7.4% of their casino revenues respectively, were much higher than French
Partouche's 4.5%. A plausible reason is that Holland, Nevada and Strip casinos might
have newer properties and gaming equipment.
The item of Other Operation Expenses in Table 3 included cost of goods sold and
operating expenses other than labor and cost of goods sold incurred in revenue centers,
general and administrative expenses, operating expenses of various service centers, and
miscellaneous expenditures. While the impact of European government involvement on
casino expenses is mainly reflected on their high average tax rates on gaming revenue,
there are other expenses resulting from such involvement. Holland Casino had
"remuneration paid to Supervisory Board" and "contributions to municipal activities."
French Partouche had "social agencies" cost. The amounts of those expenses were
insignificant and were all included in Other Operation Expenses.
The total Other Operation Expenses of Nevada and Strip casinos, 30.4% and 30.2%
of casino revenues respectively, were more than triple Holland Casino's 8.1% and more
than double French Partouche's 13.5%. Casino operations in Nevada, especially on the
Strip, were typically complex with large multiple non-gaming revenue centers and a
series of service centers to support their gaming departments. Nevada casinos, and Strip
casinos in particular, have large-scale rooms and food and beverage (F&B) operations.
In 1998, the rooms revenue was 16.7% of total revenue for Nevada and 21.9% for the
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Strip. The F&B revenue percentages for Nevada and the Strip were 17.8% and 16.1%
respectively (Nevada Gaming Abstract, 1999). In contrast, Holland Casino had no
lodging operation at all. For French Partouche, only 16 of its 23 casinos had
accompanying lodging operations (Masud, 1999). Holland casinos· F&B constituted
only 4.3% of its total casino revenue (Holland Casino, 1999). Partouche 's rooms and
F&B made up 10.4% and 6.6% of its total revenue respectively (Group Partouche
Casinos-Hotels, 1999).
In Nevada, the main purpose of non-gaming revenue centers is to entice players into
gaming rather than to create profits of their own. The gaming department's revenue
increase is often achieved at the cost of other revenue centers. Prices of rooms and meals
are often purposely set low to attract players. The food operations of Nevada and Strip
casinos actually suffered significant losses in 1998 (Nevada Gaming Abstract, 1999).
The operational complexity and the sacrificing of non-gaming revenue centers for the
gaming department tactic of Nevada and Strip casinos may well explain why their total
other operating expense percentages were so high in contrast to those of Holland Casino
and French Partouche.

Different Markets, Different Performance
The comparative analysis shows that in 1998, casinos in Holland and France
outperformed casinos in the U.S., those in Nevada and on the Las Vegas Strip in
particular, in both revenue efficiency and profitability. Why did European casinos
perform better than their U. S. counterparts? There were two conceivable reasons. First,
the gaming markets of Dutch and French casinos were less saturated thanks to either
monopoly or relatively high barriers to entry. The noncompetitive nature of European
markets enabled them to pursue expansions in a less aggressive manner, thus avoiding
market saturation. In the two European countries, although gaming demand is strong,
there have been no massive gaming expansions, such as those seen in the U. S. The 10
Holland casinos were gradually opened to the public during a long period of 23 years
between 1976 and 1998 (Holland Casino, 1999, March). In France, gaming devices
including slots and tables increased by 22% from 1994 to 1998, while casino visits
increased by 53% (Interior Ministry of France, 1999). Strong demand with relatively
limited supply helped casinos in the two European countries realize higher wins per
table/slot and higher revenue per employee. Secondly, although Holland Casino and
French Partouche had to pay higher gaming taxes, they enjoyed cost advantage in most
other areas, especially in marketing and promotion. Their overall low operating cost
undoubtedly benefited their profitability. Here again, the absence of intense competition
helped them lower operating costs and achieve high profit margins.
In contrast, U. S. gaming markets are quite different. Lack of monopoly and
relatively low barriers to entry tend to foster fierce competition among casinos. To
compete for market shares, casinos are constantly engaged in massive expansions,
quickly leading to overcapacity and market saturation. According to Ader, et al. (1999),
there are serious concerns that U.S. gaming markets are either saturated or fast
approaching saturation. In general, both Nevada and New Jersey operators continue to
face significant competition and challenging business conditions. Emerging markets
overall have essentially reached their saturation points. The overbuilding has resulted in
a highly competitive environment with increased pressure on gaming revenue and profit
margins. Vogel (2001) reports that Nevada gaming profits fell from about $1.4 billion in
1997 to $500 million in 2000. The drop in profits for Strip casinos was even worsefrom $1 billion in 1997 to $200 million in 2000. A most recent example of weak
performance from the Las Vegas Strip is the poor operation results of the Aladdin, a $1.2
billion casino hotel on the Strip that opened in August 2000. As noted by Strow (2001),
the property reported a staggering net loss of $47.2 million for the first quarter of 2001
and the casino was in need of cash infusion to avoid bankruptcy. Aladdin also had a loss
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in the 4th quarter of 2000. Analysts have attributed Aladdin's poor performance to new
room inventory that doesn't bring increased demand (Berns, 2000).
A noticeable trend of the casino operations in Nevada, and those on the Strip in
particular, is the rising weight of non-gaming revenue in total casino revenue. In 1990,
non-gaming revenue accounted for 39% of total casino revenue in Nevada and 42% on
the Strip (Nevada Gaming Control Board, 1991). By 1998, non-gaming revenue
increased to 44% of total revenue for Nevada and 50% for the Strip (Nevada Gaming
Abstract, 1999). According to Nevada Gaming Abstract (1999 & 2000), since 1999,
non-gaming revenue has outweighed gaming revenue on the Strip. To meet the changing
market demand, Las Vegas has been making efforts to transform itself from a pure
gambling town into a family vacation destination in recent years. Turning to non-gaming
sources for revenue reflects such a transition. In contrast, Holland Casino and French
Partouche have gaming revenue as their predominant revenue source. In 1998, gaming
revenue constituted 80% and 66% of their total revenues respectively. Non-gaming
operations are usually less profitable than gaming operations. The lower profitability of
Nevada and the Strip also mirrors the impact of rising non-gaming revenue in casino
operations.
It must be pointed out that variance in accounting methods could have an impact on
the profitability ratios. This study was conducted based on the statistics provided by the
1998 Annual Reports of Holland Casino and French Partouche and Nevada Gaming
Abstract 1998. A limitation of the study is that it could not control for the effect of
European casinos' different accounting methods on costs and thus on profits. For
example, the exclusion of retirement benefits from Partouche 's labor cost could push up
its profit margins, although its Annual Report notes that the amount of the company's
commitment on retirement payments was insignificant. Furthermore, because of
government involvement in the gaming industry in Europe, there may be tax reductions,
employee severance waiver agreements, asset partnering, net income sharing, low
interest financing, etc. All these could have an effect on the expenses and profits. None
of these, however, were disclosed in the reports of Holland Casino and French
Partouche. Therefore, the derived profitability figures of the two European casino
companies, French Partouche in particular, may not be exactly compatible with those of
Nevada and Strip casinos. Therefore, readers should focus more on the revenue
efficiency comparisons.

Summary
The comparative analysis ofU. S. casinos versus their Holland and French peers
has shown significant performance gaps in revenue efficiency and profitability. Different
market environments should explain, to a large degree, these performance gaps. The
noncompetitive market conditions have undoubtedly contributed to Holland and French
casinos' better revenue efficiency and profit margins. Although European casinos have
to pay more gaming taxes, their lower spending on most other cost items, marketing and
promotion in particular, have helped boost their profitability.
Monopoly and high barriers can benefit the revenue and profit margins of European
casinos. They are, however, not welcomed by consumers who look upon competition as
a means for better prices and products. Monopolistic gaming markets are not suitable for
the U.S. where free competition is constantly changing the quantity and quality of
gaming products. Commenting on Las Vegas and European casinos, Thompson (1998)
points out that Las Vegas casinos are large, ostentatiously colorful, and full of
excitement, whereas European casinos are drab in appearance.
Competition can motivate casino firms to provide better services and products,
hence benefiting customers. Nevertheless, oversupply, which often results in cutthroat
competition among casinos, is detrimental to the healthy growth of the gaming industry.
Oversupply and market saturation have already occurred in some U.S. gaming markets
UNLV Gaming Research & Review Joumal • Volume 6, Issue 2

61

and are hurting casinos' operating results. To improve their performance, U. S. casino
operators should take measures to curb the overcapacity and alleviate market saturation.
This study provides only a glimpse of the performance of European casinos in
contrast with their U.S. peers. To give a comprehensive picture of the differences
between European and U.S. casinos, a study including more European countries and
more U.S. gaming jurisdictions is needed. In particular, Native American casinos,
whose market environments bear some similarity to those of European casinos, should
be added. Including more data from U. S. and European casinos, such a study could
thoroughly reveal the operating features of European casinos versus their U.S.
counterparts and provide more in-depth explanations for the differences in their
performance.
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